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Essays in Philosophical Biology 
 
 
 Philosophical biology, one might venture to assert, is an effort to delve as deeply 
as possible into the underpinnings of biological structure.  Consequently the effort will 
be, first, to understand how continuity can be maintained in the drastic change from cold-
blooded to warm-blooded vertebrates, from the property of cold-bloodedness to the 
property of warm-bloodedness.  The effort will be extended, second, to consider how 
properties, in the fully explained sense provided by philosophers, can be used to explain 
winter and summer adaptedness, and to explain adaptedness and non-adaptedness.  
Finally, the effort will take up, third, what is deeply germane in a distinction between two 
environments, the ocean and land environment – for the relational supporting and the 
attributional suited to dictate very different accounts of environment and species in the 
Pacific Ocean and on the North American continent. 
 The three efforts just mentioned will be presented as:  I.  Can evolution be 
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I.  Can Evolution Be Philosophical Integrated? 
 
 The present discussion will first show that the cold-blooded to warm-blooded 
change in land vertebrates is insurmountable philosophically.  Thus the issue is quite 
unlike the physical issue, where it is clear that the change did happen.  What could a 
philosophical account have to offer that would create a difficulty in understanding so 
clear a change at the physical level?  More specifically the difficulty can be presented in 
the following way. 
 Lewontin (1978) says “the wholesale reconstruction of a reptile to make a bird is 
considered a process of major adaptation by which birds solved the problem of flight.”  
What Lewontin does not point out is that the process of adaptation is from being not 
adapted to flight (reptile) to being adapted to flight (bird).  For what else could process of 
adaptation mean?  Process is from an animal having one property, non-adaptedness, to 
another animal having a different property, adaptedness.  But can the change from non-
adaptedness to adaptedness be bridged in an evolutionary setting?  So a comment on the 
evolutionary setting would seem appropriate. 
 Land evolution as paleontology is from reptiles to birds on the one hand and to 
mammals on the other hand.  The evolutionary change to birds was primarily in the 
Cenozoic, mostly in the Ecocene and Oligocene (Romer, 1959; Carrol, 1988).  The 
evolutionary change of reptiles to mammals occurred throughout the Mesozoic and was 
by small intergrading steps (Carrol, 1988; Hopson, 1987; Jenkins and Parrington, 1975-
1976).  These changes are all at the morphological fossil level.  It will be assumed here 
that physiological changes went along with the morphological changes.  Thus the  
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amphibian and reptiles will be grouped together because they now have the property of 
cold bloodedness and birds and mammals will be grouped together because they now 
have the property of warm-bloodedness.1  And the feature of having the property of cold-
bloodedness changing into the property of warm-bloodedness will be thought of as an 
evolutionary change in which this property change, following a long philosophical 
tradition (Copi, 1954), will be considered a change in essential properties.  Here cold-
bloodedness and warm-bloodedness retain their respective essential identities regardless 
of the environment. 
 These essential properties are pure properties.  Impure properties are gotten when 
properties are dependent on the environment.  Impure properties include the properties of 
being discontinuously active annually in temperate regions, stemming from cold-
bloodedness, and being continually active under similar conditions, stemming from 
warm-bloodedness.  These are physical corporeal properties.  Incorporeal, abstract 
properties include being adapted, adaptedness, and being unadapted, unadaptedness. 
 Properties divide philosophers into three factions, extreme nominalists, moderate 
nominalists, and realists.  Extreme nominalists countenance only particulars (Armstrong, 
1978, 1989; Loux, 2003).  Moderate nominalists accept each particular thing as 
composed of properties (Stout, 1923, 1936; Williams, 1953; Campbell, 1981, Armstrong, 
1989; Loux, 2003).  Realists require each particular thing to have a common property 
 
_______________ 
 1Some temperatures of animals are:  cattle 100º-102.5ºF, cat 100-103.1ºF, dog 
99.5-102.5ºF, ferret 100-102.5ºF, goat 101-104.5ºF, horse 99-101.5ºF, rabbit 100.4-
105ºF, sheep 101.3-104ºF, swine 100-102ºF (Plumb, 1995); rhesus monkey 101º 
(Ransom, Fisher, Ingram); house sparrows 42ºC (Miles and Heath, 1972); Peking duck 
42ºC (108ºF) (Hagan and Heath 1980). 
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property which bridges from particular to particular (Moore, 1900-1; Russell, 1911; 
Williams, 1930; Bayliss, 1953; Quinton, 1957; Allaire, 1960; Donagan, 1963; 
Wolterstorff, 1970a, 1970; Jackson, 1977; Armstrong, 1978, 1989; Westphal, 1990; 
Loux, 2003; Moreland, 2001).  So there is this development: if there are ten of the 
moderate nominalist’s particulars with ten resembling properties, then there are ten 
instances of one common property in the realist’s ten particulars.  Ten roses with ten 
rednesses equal ten instances of one redness in ten roses.  Ten rednesses = ten instances 
of one redness. 
 The question is:  What happens when evolutionary change is seen in terms of 
moderate nominalism or realism?  If evolutionary change is found to be part of one of 
these views, it will become part of the structure of things, rather than merely a separate 
scientific consideration. 
 
The Moderate Nominalist View and the Realist View 
 The moderate nominalist view will be presented through the logically valid 
structure of contraposition.  Nagel (1977, pp. 55-70) stresses this structure as being one 
of the basic ingredients of rational understanding of the external world, with no thinkable 
exceptions of alternates and immune from the contingencies of psychology, language, 
and culture.  Nagel’s presentation of contraposition is in the form of modus tollens and is 
sentential:  if p then q plus Not q” implies “Not p”.   Contraposition more specifically is:  
if p then q implies if not q then not p.  The converse is:  if not q then not p implies if p 
then q.  But if the subject, and object, of the sentence is separated from the predicate,  
 
  5. 
severe problems emerge whether to treat contraposition (and converse) nominalistically 
or realistically. 
 The logically valid form contraposition plus the converse provide equivalence.  
Thus a dyadic (two-part) structure (x is adapted to y) is impressed upon the external 
world, following Hulburt (1992, 1996, 1998).  Thus we can portray aspects of the 
foregoing discussion in the following way: 
 (  y)[Ty ⋅ (Bxy ⊃ Axy)] ≡ (  y)[Ty ⋅ (~Axy ⊃ ~Bxy)].                                      (1) 
Which is:  There is a y such that y is an annual temperate temperature range and if x is 
behaviorally active throughout y then x is adapted to y – equivalent to (≡):  there is a y 
such that y is an annual temperate temperature range and if x is not adapted to y then x is 
not behaviorally active throughout y.  Any single bird or mammal (except hibernators) 
can be put for x, so that x takes this animal as a value; thence the part to the left describes 
it as it actually and factually is – adapted because active the whole year – and the part to 
the right describes it as it can be counterfactually imagined to be, as it would be if it were 
otherwise than it is.  Any single amphibian or reptile can be put for x, so that x takes this 
animal as a value; thence the part to the right describes it as it actually and factually is – 
unadapted because not active the whole year – and the part to the left describes it as it can 
be counterfactually imagined to be, as it would be if it were otherwise than it is. 
 It is to be pointed out that when x is behaviorally active throughout y, x has the 
property of being behaviorally active throughout y, and when x is adapted to y, x has the 
property of being adapted to y.  And likewise when x is not adapted to y, x has the 
property of not being adapted to y, and when x is not behaviorally active throughout y, x 
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has the property of not being behaviorally active throughout y.  These properties are 
confined to each animal x in the view of the moderate nominalist.  But according to the 
realist each property, each numerically single thing, is exemplified, embodied, 
instantiated in every particular bird and mammal, in every particular amphibian and 
reptile.  The importance of taking the realist view is that properties make birds and 
mammals cohere as a group and amphibians and reptiles cohere as a group. 
 Expression (1) portrays the two properties of warm-blooded birds and mammals 
(hibernators excepted) and the two complementary properties of cold-blooded 
amphibians and reptiles, without showing any evolutionary coherence between the two 
groups of animals and between their properties. 
 It is possible that the variable x, if not a mere part of a linguistic logical 
schematism, could be instead, in some way, a real ingredient in complementation, in the 
change from unadapted to adapted.  The variable x, one might postulate, should remain 
single throughout in the reality underlying the schematism of expression (1).  The 
variable x should be unaffected by its association with positive or negative properties.  It 
should be part, perhaps, of the bundle of properties that compose each animal (Stout, 
1923, 1936; Loux, 1970).  But the first interpretation of (1) is in the moderate 
nominalistic tradition, in the Stoutian sense that properties (universals) exist within the 
confines of particulars, particular animals, but do not bridge the gap between particulars.  
And so the variable x cannot bridge the gap either. 
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 Thus the moderate nominalist interpretation of (1) makes the use of logical 
validity seem to need justification.  But can interpretation in the realist tradition be 
achieved and thus make evolution philosophically integrative and cohering? 
 
The Realism of Variables 
 Moore (1993, p. 94) and many others treat predicates as entities that variables 
have.  Quine (1972, p. 115) objects.  For Moore Fx is: x has F; for Quine Fx is: x is F.  In 
the standard formula for the identity of indiscernibles Fx is: x has F: 
 (F)(Fx ≡ Fy) ⊃ (x = y),1   (2) 
if, for every property, F, x has F if and only if y has F, then x is identical with y.  More 
briefly, in the arresting words of Armstrong (1989, p. 66) “if two things have the very 
same properties, then they are the very same thing.”  There is a certain convenience here 
for if (2) is rewritten in accord with Quine’s view we get the much more cumbersome: 
 [(z)(Fz ⊃ Hxz) ≡ (z)(Fz ⊃ Hyz)] ⊃ (x = y),   (3) 
if, for all z if z is F then x has z, if and only if, for all z if z is F then y has z – then x is 
identical with y (x and y are the same, are one). 
 If we stick with Armstrong’s succinct words, we see, as he suggests, that the 
identity of indiscernibles is ideally expressive of an animal’s (thing’s) being a bundle of 
properties, as previously mentioned.  So the issue is whether two animals can be one 
(Loux, 1976) or whether the whole principle of same properties same animal can be 
falsified by the possibility of two animals – or many animals – with exactly the same 
___________________ 
    1 This is an instance, since the quantifiers, (x) and (y), have been omitted. 
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properties.  But this 2-1, 1-2 impasse does not turn up in Fz of (3), which is z is F.  Since 
the property of being adapted, adaptedness, is single, z is F, z is adaptedness, means that z 
and F are one. 
 The avoidance of impasse suggests another view, which is that variables in 
general can be considered non-linguistically and thus not as vehicles taking particulars as 
values, as when any animal is put for x or y in (3).  Thus variables can be considered as 
real ingredients of the external world as in z is F in the sense of z and F being one above.  
A variable, then, would be part of F in x is F, part of F in y is F.   We are not to interpret 
Fx as x is an instance of F, x is an example of F, for this would be Fa, a is F – a is a 
constant and cannot be associated, in good conscience, with F and ~F.  But x can, z can 
too.  Denial applies to the whole of Fa in ~Fa but only to F in ~Fx, because a exemplifies 
F and x doesn’t.  The variable z is the whole of F in z is F above.  But the variable is part 
of F, a bit of F, in x is F, in y is F. 
 So x is a bit of F.  Likewise in Bxy ⊃ Axy, x is a bit of B and A.  And there is no 
reason that x should not be a bit of, a part of ~A and ~B in ~Axy ⊃ Bxy.  This is a marked 
departure from normal procedure.  But x is the same x throughout.  Even in the case of 
the essential properties of being warm-blooded or not being warm-blooded corresponding 
to x is a part of a warm-blooded animal or x is a part of a not warm-blooded animal in  
Wx v ~Wx, the same bit, x, persists throughout.  And so validity in (1) and Wx v ~Wx is a 
coherence endowing ingredient of nature when our subjective view is transformed by our 
objectified variable x. 
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Realism 
 Giving up the standard value-taking role of a linguistic variable, and instead 
avowing a real variable, allows jumping the gap between complementary properties.  You 
can get in (1) in reverse from the not adapted not continuously active x to the 
continuously active adapted x in the evolutionary process by the coherence endowing x.  
Thus the logical schematism of (1) is no longer an empty subjective schematism but is 
the reality of nature – a reality unreducible to the discontinuities of mere physicality. 
 Traditionally realism means that particulars have common properties and the 
more common properties they have the more similar they are until they have the very 
same properties as in the identity of indiscernibles.  The gaps between terrestrial 
vertebrates are bridged by so many common characteristics or properties.  And the 
emergence of so many different combinations of properties occurs as the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles breaks down a little and provides for the many animals of the 
same species, for each individual has most of the properties as each other within the 
species.  And when the identity of indiscernibles breaks down a lot, all the different 
species of the terrestrial vertebrates are provided for.  But this does not take care of any 
change in the sense of contrapositional equivalence.  In order for evolution to have 
occurred, as in the contrapositional (4) next, the variable as an objective reality is 
required to be continuous, as it is schematically and subjectively.  Next is: 
 (  y) [Ty ⋅ (~Bxy ⊃ ~Axy) ≡ (  y) [Ty ⋅ (Axy ⊃ Bxy)].  (4) 
Which is:  There is a y such that y is the same as an annual temperate temperature range 
and if x is a part of a not behaviorally active animal within y then x is a part of an animal  
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not adapted to y – equivalent to: there is a y such that y is the same as an annual temperate 
temperature range and if x is part of an animal adapted to y then x is part of a 
behaviorally active animal within y.  In this presentation one x runs throughout.  This one 
x is unaffected as it becomes part first of a not adapted animal then second of an adapted 
animal.  The reason for using x in this way is to make the unadapted parts and adapted 
parts of nature cohere.  Without this coherence evolution as a process could not occur. 
 
Recapitulation 
 We cannot understand evolution without contraposition and without the 
symbolism of predicate logic.  We are quite used to our language of predication as in 
‘Jones is ill’ or ‘x is ill’ grading into ‘Jones is a man’ or ‘x is a man’.  We accept the 
identity of ‘x is a man’ without noticing that beyond the confines of language there is the 
reality that language attempts to get hold of.  It is not noticed, remarkably, that though 
there are two things, two entities, in the linguistic ‘x is a man’, there is just one real 
entity.  The make-believe world of language and logical schematism must be altered for a 
real world, x must be the same as or at least part of man in such a world.  And when, as 
mentioned in (3), z is adaptedness, this means that z and adaptedness are the same one 
thing.  Thus the variable z is the whole of the property adaptedness.  Likewise in (4) the 
variable y is the whole of the annual temperature range, for they are the same one thing.  
Finally, x is part of an animal not active under y, so not adapted to y; if and only if x is 
part of another animal adapted to y, so active under y.  Same x.  Two animals.  Without 
same x evolution would not be understandable.  But understandable is not the point.   
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There would be no evolution if a real, single x were not split across two animals, when 
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II.  Properties and Adaptation 
 
 There are properties.  There are universals.  At least for some philosophers there 
are.  And in this essay we are going to follow the philosophers who endorse and hold dear 
properties as constituents of things.  We will rely on such late twentieth century critical 
arguments in favor of properties as those given by Jackson (1977), Loux (1970, 1976, 
1998), Wolterstorff (1970), Armstrong (1989), and Moreland (2001). 
 Two basic schools of thought view properties, or universals, in two basically 
different ways.  One school is the moderate nominalist or trope school.  Here properties 
are confined to the particulars that have the properties, which in turn compose, constitute 
the particular.  Here properties of similar particular things are similar; similar properties 
of similar things form a similarity set – the adaptednesses of different organisms form a 
set of adaptednesses. 
 The other school insists that properties are not confined to particulars; this school 
is the metaphysical realist school.  Here a single property, adaptedness say, is repeated 
from particular organism to particular organism.  The adaptedness of flying is repeated, is 
instantiated in this bird or that bird, in this bird species or that bird species.  Such a 
numerically single property is instantiated, is exemplified not just in different organisms 
and species.  A numerically single property, or characteristic, can be exemplified, by a 
species in different ways: there is adaptedness in division rate to ten different 
temperatures by two algal species (Hulburt, 2002).  There is multiple exemplification of 
the numerically one property in numerically ten aspects of these species.  And the 
question is: how can the realist see his way their being this multiple exemplification?  If  
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the realist can accomplish this, the advantages are enormous.  One entity, adaptedness, 
would integrate the multiplicity of biota and their processes into one whole. 
 Thus, if we assume a full-blown realist view, what character would a property 
such as overwintering have?  The answer is very simple.  There is agreement among the 
organisms, the species, the groups that overwinter: they all have special features for 
getting through the winter.  Thus because many entities simultaneously overwinter, the 
realist is confident that one and the same universal is exhibited or exemplified by a 
multitude of plants and animals or by many species of plants and animals.  But to 
champion this audacious scheme wholly, the realist is forced to avow a non-spatio-
temporal view, because one thing cannot simultaneously be in several places – one 
universal, if it is physical, cannot occur in its entirety, in non-overlapping, discontinuous 
regions at the same time.  But there is no difficulty with overwintering, because the 
character of overwintering, like adaptedness, is not spatio-temporal in itself.  In itself it is 
incorporeal.  Overwintering and adaptedness are incorporeal but enter into the things that 
have them, just as ‘north of’ is incorporeal and abstract in itself but does enter into the 
cities referred to in ‘Edinburgh is north of London’ – Russell’s (1997) well-know 
example.  But physical properties can and should be treated as abstract, not just to be 
consistent but to promote an insight into the nature of a property.  Then when such 
properties enter into particulars they are concrete exemplifications. 
 Thence a numerically single, unifying universal when entering into a particular, 
even a diffuse particular such as a species, dictates a structure for the particular.  Suppose 
we consider one oyster; if it is like other oysters it pumps through its gill system 9 liters  
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of water in one hour between 16º and 28ºc (Loosanoff, 1958; Hulburt, 2002).  This is an 
attribute, a property of oysters in general, this pumping rate.  So on the one hand 
constituents such as gills, digestive system, shell, etc. are tied together by intercellular 
stickiness; on the other hand constituents such as pumping rate are tied into the physical 
stuff by a metaphysical glue.  The rate in itself is as diaphanous and incorporeal as ‘north 
of’ or adaptedness or overwinteringness.  And so there must be a metaphysical tie that 
ties together the instances of corporeal properties, such as gills, and the instances of 
incorporeal properties, such as pumping rate.  The tie and properties are transmitted to all 
oysters, to the collection of all oysters, to the kind of thing that an oyster is. 
 Now there must be, one school of realists theorizes, an individuating principle to 
account for each oyster.  There is no trouble in telling one oyster from another; of all 
animals they are the most easily distinguished from each other.  But this 
distinguishability should be accounted for in constructing ontologically an oyster from 
the basic materials of properties and ties.  And so we should have an individuating 
element, an element variously labeled bare substrate, bare particular, individuator – in the 
view of the substrate-attribute realist.  This element is also a propertyless bearer of 
properties, for it is tied to the properties, to the instantations of properties.  When we say 
that a particular has such and such properties, this is the element that does the having, the 
possessing of the properties. 
 But a certain possibility has to be guarded against, which is what the propertyless 
individuator does.  Suppose man-made objects, like two samples of the same shade and 
brand of paint, are considered – these two samples by having the same properties (same  
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shade, same chemistry) would be the same, would be one and not two, if it were not for 
the individuating propertyless bearer of properties.  And it cannot be the case, the realist 
argues, that the samples are two by location, one to the left of the other, for example, for 
numerical difference must occur first in order for location difference to occur second.  Of 
course, although we have managed by the device of the individuator to keep the two 
samples of paint two, they are totally alike; they are, to use a technical phrase, 
qualitatively indiscernible.  A further point is the possibility that natural objects might 
conceivably be exactly alike; two squirrels perhaps could be exactly alike, or 
qualitatively indiscernible.  
 The individuator is not the only way that something can have or possess 
properties.  If a core collection of instantiations of properties is bound together by inter-
cellular stickiness plus a tie to hold onto the instantiations of the nebulous, incorporeal 
properties (rate of pumping, rate of growth, rate of cell division) this core collection can 
be repeated.  Each repeat, each organism, is a whole.  Each can possess extra, ephemeral 
properties, which are accidental and contrast to the essential properties of the core.  The 
variety of shapes of the oyster are accidental but the thick, bivalve shells are essential.  
But each whole, each repeat is a member in a kind, which is a species.  And species can 
be members in a further kind, a genus.  And genera are members in the kind, family.  And 
so on, to still larger taxonomic categories. 
 The way that initial taxonomic categories come about ontologically, is by the 
breakdown of the identity of indiscernibles.  This principle requires properties, which  
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includes the view of the metaphysical realist.  The principle says that “if two things have 
the very same properties, then they are the very same thing” (Armstrong’s succinct 
words, 1989, p. 66).  But as pointed out above in the case of the paint samples the two 
things can be kept two by an individuator, but they will be exactly alike.  This happens in 
machine-made things.  But natural things, the individuals of a species, seem usually not 
to be exactly alike.  Consider, then, the gray squirrels of North America.  Already they do 
not share all the same properties, since there are 5-6 subspecies (Pratt, 1935; Steele and 
Kaprowski, 2001).  Somewhat less sharing of properties happens between gray squirrels 
and fox squirrels, for these two species have a different number of premolar teeth.  So 
speciation is an initial taxonomic category process and is obviously an identity of 
indiscernibles breakdown. 
 Summarizing, “a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable 
abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances” 
(Moreland, 2001, p. 74).  Non-spatio-temporal is equitable with abstract, and both of 
these with incorporeal.  Tie is eminently philosophical; if you could breathe life into the 
word ‘and’ and make it part of the structure of the world, you would have tie.  
Individuator (bare particular, bare substrates) plays a dual role of distinguishing between 
entities that are totally alike and thus qualitatively indiscernible and being the anchor that 
properties (their instantiations) are hitched to. 
 The biologist’ species has a dual role, too, in that a species is a single, scattered 
thing, like a dealt deck of cards, a broken plate, the plankton, the Milky Way.  A species 
is also a kind – closely akin to a class, a set – of which the pieces, the organisms are  
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members.  A further point here is that although the species is a scattered thing, the pieces 
transmit from the metaphysical structure of properties, tie, and individuator the property 
portion to the species – each redwood has tallness, the species redwood has tallness.  And 
although the identity of indiscernibles may be broken down initially to provide species, 
only a few physical properties are left in an exhaustive breakdown to provide for the 
great classes, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibian, insects, angiosperms and 
gymnosperms.  However, the non-physical, incorporeal properties cut across in an 
uncorrelated way these taxonomic groups.  This will be clear in what follows: 
 
Winter and Summer Adaptedness 
 There are various groupings when only the properties of overwintering, of spring 
– summer growth, and being adapted (adaptedness) are to be exemplified, instantiated.  
The property adaptedness will be seen to be the inclusive property.  Next are these 
groupings for land biota in temperate regions.  These groupings are properties of a 
property, just as red is a color tells us that the property of redness is a property of 
coloredness. 
 1.  Overwintering by bare limbs 
 2.  Overwintering by seeds 
 3.  Overwintering by underground parts 
 4.  Overwintering by diapause stages 
 5.  Overwintering by hibernation 
1 – 5 are instantiations of the property of overwintering.  Overwintering is exemplified by 
each bare limb of every deciduous tree.  Each seed of each annual plant instantiates over- 
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wintering.  The property of overwintering is embodied in all underground parts of 
perennials.  An insect’s larvae diapause stage is an instantiation of the property of over-
winteringness.  Mammals when they hibernate multiply exemplify the biological 
characteristic of overwintering. 
 All these instances are substance instances.  Each instance, each exemplification, 
is a whole tree, a whole seed, a whole underground part, a whole diapause (larval) stage, 
a whole sleeping (hibernating) animal.  Property instances are radically different.  There 
is the overwinteringness of each one of these entities (tree, seed, etc.) – all these over-
winteringnesses are property instances; they are tropes, too.  And further these over-
winteringnesses, taken apart from the organisms they are in, are indistinguishable from 
each other and simply revert to the numerically single property, overwinteringness. 
 Overwinteringness, the property of overwintering, is related to the further 
property, the property of winter adaptedness.  The relation, it was just said, is such that 
overwintering is a property of the property of being winter adapted.  There is, I think, 
nothing strange here.  We just have a simple sequence, with winter adaptedness a capping 
property, a terminal universal.  But this sequence is such that overwintering dictates 
winter adaptedness necessarily, just as redness dictates coloredness necessarily. 
 Then for the spring – summer growth and activity property that the land biota has 
there are these groupings. 
 6.  The spring-summer growth of leafy limbs 
 7.  The spring-summer growth of annual plants 
 8.  The spring-summer growth of above-ground parts 
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 9.  The spring-summer growth of non-diapause stages 
 10.  The spring-summer activity of non-hibernation 
6-9 are instantiations of the property of spring-summer growth, wherein 6. is for 
deciduous trees, 7. is for annual plants, 8. is for perennial plants, 9. is for winged, non-
diapause insects, and 10. is for active mammals that do hibernate.  These instantiations, 
these instances, are substance instantiations. 
 Spring-summer growth is a property of the property of spring-summer 
adaptedness.  So spring-summer growth dictates spring-summer adaptedness necessarily. 
 In this section there is only affirmation of adaptedness.  In the next section only 
affirmation of adaptedness will be the result also. 
 
Reciprocal Adaptedness 
 Birds are to be considered separately.  The striking aspect of most manuals on 
birds is that every species has a picture of the species and a map showing the area where 
it is found.  So it has adaptedness to the area of its occurrence, otherwise it would not be 
there.  Now let us think of single but different case.  You get the ground ready for the 
plants you are going to plant in your garden – you make the ground adapted to the plants.  
Then you plant the seeds or plants and if they come up or do well they are adapted to the 
ground.  In this two step way you can see that the plants are adapted to the ground which 
is adapted to them.  And this reciprocal adaptedness is necessary, otherwise the plants 
would not be there.  Likewise with birds and their areas of occurrence.  For bird species 
that do not migrate each species is an instance of the property of reciprocal adaptedness 
with respect to its area of occurrence, both when it is breeding there and when it is not  
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breeding there.  For birds that migrate there are northern breeding areas where the species 
are instances of reciprocal adaptedness and southern wintering areas where the species 
are instances of reciprocal adaptedness.  That is, the species multiply exemplify 
reciprocal adaptedness when breeding and when not breeding. 
 More generally birds exemplify the property of overwintering when they are not 
breeding and often in southern areas and they exemplify the property of the spring-
summer correlate to growth when they are breeding and often in northern areas.  Thence 
overwintering – southern – non-breeding dictates winter adaptedness necessarily and 
northern – breeding dictates summer adaptedness necessarily. 
 Only affirmation of adaptedness is the result here.  But in the next section both 
affirmation and denial of adaptedness seem to be the appropriate interpretations. 
 
Adaptedness and Non-Adaptedness 
 Angiosperms, insects, hibernating mammals, and birds have been described by 
properties which are constituents of each organism’s structure.  Constituents include 
properties, the tie, and the individuator, which is that property-less bearer of properties.  
But properties are the crucial constituents, and very few of them are relevant to the 
description at hand.  What is needed are properties that describe several more large 
groups.  And it is noticeable that the organisms described so far have very distinct 
morphological or physiological differences between winter and summer forms, so that 
there could be both winter and summer adaptedness.  But other organisms lack any 
difference between winter and summer forms.  Gymnosperms and cold-blooded  
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vertebrate on the one hand and non-hibernating mammals on the other hand are such 
groups of organisms in temperate regions. 
 Let us consider the property of being year-round functional in the sense that the 
organism is metabolically and behaviorally active year-round – this would be in a non-
hibernating mammal.  Therefore this property, instantiated in each such animal could be a 
property of the property of year-round adaptedness and thus dictate the property of year-
round adaptedness.  Then let us consider the property of not being year-round functional 
– getting through the winter in a moribund or inert state and only coming to life, so to 
speak, with the return of spring and summer.  Cold-blooded animals and gymnosperms 
are substance instances of such a property.  And such a property is a property of the 
property of not being year-round adapted.  Not being year-round functional dictates not 
being year-round adapted. 
 So there is both affirmation and denial of adaptedness here. 
 
Discussion 
 One may wonder why a theory of the structure of a particular organism or species 
has been followed, in which properties, tie, and individuator are required – this is the 
substrate attribute theory.  Instead a theory having only properties might have been 
followed – this is the bundle theory.  At first the tie seemed to be required to glue the 
abstract, incorporeal attributes to the physical attributes.  But now the bare substrate, the 
propertyless bearer of properties – the individuator – seems to be required in order to 
steer the identity of indiscernibles away from lapsing into ambiguity.  The next three 
steps portray this ambiguity. 
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 1)  If the bundle theory is espoused, then it is not only true but necessarily true in 
the sense that every property of the bundle is an essential constituent in the structure of a 
thing.  2) And if it is impossible for two things to share all their properties because 
complete qualitative indiscernability entails numerical identity (Loux, 1998, pp. 106-
107), then two things that conceivably do share their properties are not two but are one, 
are numerically identical.  3) But being one can be falsified by the logical possibility of 
two things that are exactly alike (Armstrong, 1989, p. 67), because two things exactly 
alike in empirically pure properties might differ by each having an impure property the 
other does not have, such as being identical with itself or being in a certain location 
(Loux, 1998, p. 110).  This ambiguous 2-1, 1-2 vacillation ought to be avoided.  Thus an 
individuator would seem to be required, and the identity of indiscernibles can then be 
used in a further and exhaustive breakdown to derive ontologically the taxonomy of 
species. 
 As our exposition has progressed the instances of properties have clearly come to 
be whole organisms.  Instances of this sort, it was said, are substance instances.  But the 
overwinteringness in one single animal (or one single plant stage) is one instance and this 
is a property instance – just as the redness of one rose is a property instance of the 
redness in all the roses of that shade of red.  Substance instances, whole concrete animals 
or plants form kinds (closely akin to sets or classes).  Substance instances form species, 
in other words.  So each animal or plant is a member in a kind; a species.  Now there are 
many property instances that are constituents of each organism, that thus account for the 
repetition of properties so that there are common properties shared by all the members of  
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the species.  But few of these common properties are shared in the large classes when the 
properties are physical.  When properties are incorporeal, there is extensive sharing in the 
large classes. 
 Some common properties mentioned so far are shared as follows: 
 1.  Overwintering 3.  Winter adaptedness 
 2.  Spring – summer growth 4.  Summer adaptedness 
  




 Hibernating mammals 
 Birds 
 
 Further properties are: 
 5.  Year-round functionality 7.  Year-round adaptedness 
 6.  Year-round non-functionality 8.  Year-round non-adaptedness 
 
 And their substance instances are in: 
 Non-hibernating mammals (5. and 7.) 
 Cold-blooded vertebrates and gymnosperms (6. and 8.) 
 
 The portrayal of adaptation in the larger taxonomic classes has nothing to do with 
the evolutionists’ portrayal of adaptation.  There is no reason that the evolutionists’ 
adaptation as a result of natural selection should preclude a different approach to  
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adaptation.  There is every reason to abandon the evolutionists’ approach with its 
supposition of natural selection and embrace an empirically based approach, as here and 
as presented in Hulburt (1996. 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004). 
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 During the Twentieth Century a great many articles on universals advanced 
insight into their structure so that the books by Armstrong, Loux, and Moreland could 
summarize this insight.  In this article I have relied on a reading of some of these studies 
and on the books particularly.  I have selected what seemed salient and arresting aspects 
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III.  A View of Two Worlds 
 
 A view of two worlds is presented in the following description: 
 (A)  If there’s one environment that supports (is suited to) many species, 
        then those species are supported by (are suited to) one or more 
        environments. 
There are two worlds here.  One world is a confronting, effective world held together by 
a relation, the relation of supporting; x supports y so y is supported by some x or other.  
The other world is a neutral, benign world of attributes, where x is suited to y; x has the 
attribute of being suited to y – and perhaps y is suited to x too.  There is a great difference 
between the relation, supporting, and the attribute, being suited to.  And so the 
environment may be viewed as supporting, producing, many species, wherein supporting 
in itself is separate from it and the species.  But the environment may also be viewed as 
having, possessing the attribute (property) of being suited to, being adapted to many 
species as a part of the composition of the environment. 
 The two world view that is being put forward can be elaborated upon by pointing 
out that in the case of supporting the description above is logically valid, but that in the 
case of suited to the description is not logically valid.  In the case of the relational 
supporting the above structure by itself endows validity.  But in the other case the 
attributional suited to could be logically valid if it were ensconced in a factual situation.  
Thus if x were, as a matter of fact, suited to y and y were, as a matter of fact, suited to x, 
then further elaboration would achieve logical validity.  This is shown as follows: 
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 (B)  If an environment is suited to a species, then the species is suited to the  
        environment; and if the species is suited to the environment, then the  
        environment is suited to the species – equivalent to: species is suited to  
        environment if and only if environment is suited to species. 
This is compendious, to be sure, but it is valid (Hulburt, 2002).  And it certainly seems to 
drive the point home.  And yet, does it really drive the point home?  Not really, because – 
 (B) is ambiguous, as further refinement shows.  In the case (1) that one single 
environment is large and undifferentiated and yet harbors a number of species, no one-to-
one correspondence between the one environment and its various species can occur.  In 
the contrasting case (2) each distinct environment is paired with each distinct species 
uniquely and one-to-one correspondence is achieved. 
 So (B) gets two results, one with no one-to-one correspondence and one with such 
correspondence between environment and species – on the proviso that the attribute 
suited to is used.  But could such a range be gotten with (A) instead of (B). 
 We return to (A) with the relational supporting: if some one environment supports 
many species, then each of the many species is supported by its own environment.  This 
is a little different from the original (A) – this is a modified perception of the latitude 
available from this logical model.  Though one environment might support many species 
and the many species synonymously be supported by one environment, it is quite possible 
that one large environment could support many species each of which is supported by its 
own unique small environment (Copi, 1979, pp. 120-122). 
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 Examples of the two aspects of (A) are, first: the blue tropical Pacific Ocean has 
many species of gastropod plankton larvae, which are supported by this single great 
environment (Sheltema, et al., 1996); and second, the North American continent which 
supports more than 900 species of birds (National Geographic, 1999) each one of which 
is supported by its distinct, unique area of occurrence.  But with the attributional suited to 
the distinction under (B) between the tropical ocean and its plankton species and the 
North American continent and its bird species is still non-one-to-one for the ocean and 
clearly one-to-one for the continent. 
 And so whether the distinction of two aspects in (A) for the confronting relational 
world view or the same distinction of two aspects in (B) for the benign attributional 
world model is made, the distinction deserves a close analytical portrayal. 
 Surjective ands bijective designations introduce sets (classes) of environments 
and species.  Surjective means that for each member in a set of environments there must 
be at least one member in a set of species that is supported by and is suited to at least one 
member of the set of environments (Lipschutz, 1998, pp. 98-99; Milewsky, 1989, p. 29).  
Here a pictorial, graphical presentation is such that environments are to the right and 
species to the left.  To have just a surjective account there have to be more members in 
the set of species to the left than there are members of the set of environments to the 
right.  To have a bijective account there have to be exactly the same number of members 
in the set of species (left) and in the set of environments (right).  So it is apparent that in 
the set of the larial plankton species where there are a number of member species and that 
in the set of the tropical ocean environments where it is the only member, the surjective  
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account applies in a non-one-to-one way, since for that environment there are a number 
of member species and each one is both supported by and suited to that one environment.  
And to have a bijective account it is apparent that the set of bird species has each member 
species supported by and suited to its particular, unique environmental area of occurrence 
in a one-to-one correspondence. 
 But there is more to bijective than this.  Bijective means that the environment-
species relation is reversible.  In the case of the set of occurrence areas of bird species 
and the set of bird species, each area is suited to its species and its species is suited to it, 
as in the one-to-one case of the valid (B).  But such reversibility is not to be had for 
supporting – the environmental area supports its species but its species does not support 
the environmental area. 
 So bijective works for the attributional suited to but not for the relational 
supporting.  And the two-world views of relations and attributes are separable when 
bijective and attributes are put together. 
 Thus a crisscross of perceptions has emerged from these analyses.  Perspicuous 
analysis thus reveals an explicit richness of content.  But a more lengthy illustration of 






   32. 
References 
Copi, I. M., 1979.  Symbolic Logic.  Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 398 pp. 
 
Hulburt, E. M., 2002.  The four principles of adaptation.  Ecol. Model., 156: 61-84. 
 
Lipschultz, S., 1998.  Set Theory and Related Topics.  McGraw Hill, New York, 282 pp. 
 
Milewsky, E. G., 1989.  The Essentials of Set Theory.  Research and Education 
 Association, Piscataway, NJ, 71 pp. 
 
National Geographic, 1999.  Field Guide to the Birds of North America.  National 
 Geographic Society, Washington, DC, 480 pp. 
 
Scheltema, R. S., I. P. Williams, and P. S. Lobel, 1996.  Retention around and long- 
 distance dispersal between oceanic islands by planktonic larvae of benthic 
 gastropod Mollusca.  Am. Mal. Bull., 12: 67-75.  
 
